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Abstract 
Important foreign land acquisitions in developing countries can lead to structural transformation in 
existing farming systems. But does the development of mega-farms create the same opportunities and 
risks for the diversity of local rural households? Based on a case study in Madagascar, this paper 
deciphers the transformations of the local agrarian systems due to the implementation of an 
agrobusiness company, aiming to produce jatropha on 5000 hectares. Focusing on the local level, it  
deciphers the ongoing impacts and tries to overcome a vision of the “local community” as an 
homogenous and congruent entity.  
Even if the plantations are still small (230 hectares), the company implementation impacts on the local 
labor market (wage increase, transition accelerated from mutual aid system to labor market), migration 
flows (new immigration and less seasonal emigration), the local farming systems (vegetable 
production stops due to commoditization of manure, development of onions thanks to new comers’ 
experience, adaptation of cattle bredding). Above all, the company plots encroach on appropriated 
land and generate conflict with the villagers. While the smaller farmers benefit from the company 
implementation (jobs, infrasctures access), the larger famers and herders are the ones who lose 
access to land, experience an income decrease and then oppose the company implementation. The 
company development also reactivates land conflicts between villagers (schematically Betsileo 
farmers and Sakalava herders) who both compete to have control over land access.  Hence, neither 
investor nor local landwners manage to have secure and legal land rights.  
A better understanding of the agrarian system and the local tenure practices is necessary to identify 
the diverse stakeholders and interests in welcoming/opposing the company. A better view on whom 
benefit/lose from the company development, whom has land rights and whom has control over land 
access gives opportunites to enhance negotiation processes, improve legal empowerment and avoid 
violent conflictual situation, detrimental for the investor and the local inhabitants.  
Introduction  
Beyond the recognition of a renewed phenomena of large-scale land deals (Cotula et al. 2009; 
Shepard & Mittal 2009; Von Braun & Meinzen‐Dick 2009; Deininger et al., 2011; Oxfam, 2011, 
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Anseeuw and al., 2012), questions are still pending on the long term effects of this phenomena on 
agrarian structures, local markets and rural social differentitation. But before addressing this big 
picture questions and debating the appropriate policies, more data have to be gathered - through a 
political economical lens - on the effective impacts and their distribution (Li, 2011; Borras et Franco, 
2012). Detailed case-study are needeed to focus on the local level, to describe the ongoing impacts 
and to overcome the vision of the “local community” as an homogenous and congruent entity (Borras 
and Franco, 2012). Case studies are also needed to analyse how the legal framework is implemented 
and how policies can be strenghtened.  
One main issue is resource access and land‐use competition between investors and local populations, 
notably when local communities’ land rights are not legally recognized and the land is considered as 
State‐owned (Cotula et al., 2009; Von Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009; Deininger et al., 2011). In 
Madagascar, beyond the well publicized abandonment of Daewoo's huge agricultural project (targeting 
1.3 million hectares of land) large-scale appropriations continue (Andrianirina Ratsialonana, 2011). 
But, unlike other southern countries, a pro-smallholder land reform is ongoing. Since 2005, profound 
legal changes have been implemented in matters of local land rights protection. The 2005 land reform 
challenges the state-ownership of a large part of the country’s land, legally recognizes individual and 
collective local land rights and promotes land management decentralization (Teyssier et al., 2009). 
Then, according to these new laws, land allocation to investors should not encroach on existing land 
rights and should be granted with prior consent of local landholders, local government and the state 
land services.  
Another main issue is the development or decrease of local socio-economical activities following the 
company implementation. In the Malagasy rural sector, 86% of the labor force is involved in 
agricultural or pastoral activities (EPM, 2010). About 85% are working mainly on their small farm - the 
average farm size is about 1,4 hectare (EPM, 2010) - while 15% are mainly agricultural workers 
(Minten and Randrianarison, 2003). Rural labor markets, very developed in the main rice production 
areas, are mostly seasonal in the other regions (rice transplanting and harvesting time). In addition, 
lots of labor transfers are still embedded in mutual aid system (Minten and Randrianarison, 2003; 
Gannon and Sandron, 2006).  
Based on a case study (cf. Medernach, 2011 in partnership with Rakotomala), this paper deals with 
the interactions between an European company aiming to produce jatropha on a 5000 hectares and 
the local population, in the Boeny region in north-western Madagascar. What transformations do this 
large-land scale acquisition and the large farm development induce ? Are the opportunities and the 
risks the same for the diversity of local rural households? Do the legal framework impact on these 
changes ?  
Through a qualitative analysis of the agrarian system2, this article draws on data collected during a 5 
months field study thanks to a 150 short and 50 in-depth and repeated interviews with interalia 
farmers, herders, the agribusiness farm’ team and political authorities. The study presents significant 
but not representative changes. Moreover, the company implementation being still recent (2009), 
changes cannot yet be defined as structural ones.  
This paper first describes the local farming systems and the agribusiness farm (section 1). It deciphers 
then the interactions relative to labor issue (section 2), land access, use and management (section 3), 
and finally relative to social and political reactions and tensions (section 4).  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
2 The methodological approach is referring to the French school of « Système agraire ».  
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Results  
I. Diversity of farms: from gradual to rapid changes  
First occupation and immigration  
In the early 19th century, Sakalava3 were the first occupant of the “Mivili4” area. Mainly herders, they 
used to make their cattle pasture on the vast and non cultivated hilly zones. Semi-nomads or settled, 
they developed villages in the eastern part of the area (see figure 1).  
 
Figure 1 “Mivili” area, cultivated areas, pasture land and the investor’s area. Source: Authors 
 
During colonization time, Betsileo5 farmers emigrated from the central region of Madagascar to the 
north western region, notably to “Miassa”, one of the biggest irrigated agricultural plain of the country. 
Few decades later, some of their descendants emigrated from “Miassa” to neighboring areas in a 
global movement starting from the plain and going upstream of the main rivers.  In the mid of the 20th 
century, some families settled in the western part of Mivili area, developed villages and grew rice in the 
well irrigated lower zones. During interviews, Bestileo farmers stated that their ancestors did not ask 
Sakalava leaders, living in distant villages, any permission to access land. Nevertheless, all Betsileo 
villagers declared that they systematically honored the Sakalava ancestors (gifts, sacrifice) when they 
had to clear or develop a new plot. Also during interviews, Sakalava herders stated that they had, as 
their ancestors did, to progressively displace their cattle to the north-eastern part of Mivili.  
The family farming systems nowadays  
Schematically, Betsileo appropriated the western part of Mivili while Sakalava appropriated the main 
part of the central and eastern part of the area. Both farmers and herders, respectively valorize the 
different agro-ecological zones (figure 2).  
                                                     
3 Sakalava and Betsileo are two ethnic groups in Madagascar. 
4 The names have been changed for confidentiality.  
5 Immigrants that came to Mivili were in majority Betsileo, but there were also other ethnic groups like Betsirebaka and 
Merina. To simplify, we will call the population that has immigrated and its descendants “Betsileo”, in oppositions of 
the first inhabitants who are Sakalava. 
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Figure 2 Landscape transect and land use for different agricultural activities (local and investor’s 
farming systems). Source : Authors 
 
Paddy fields and other cropping systems (vegetables, cassava) are in the lower areas next to water 
resources or on close hills (zone 1), while pastures are on the hilly zones (zone 2 and 3). Betsileo 
herders –having from 5 to 15 zebus each – modify their breeding system depending on the season. 
During the dry season, the cattle graze on pastures close to villages and spend the night in cattle 
pens. During the rainy season, the rice growing season, they graze night and day on pastures distant 
from villages and agricultural plots (« small kijanas6 » - zone 2). Farer at east, Sakalava herders - 
having from 50 to 300 zebus each - practice more extensive cattle breeding system. Cattle from 
different herders graze all the year round on a vast communal pasture (« big kijana » - zone 3), a 12 
km diameter circular grazing area delimited by villages (see figure 1). As the zebus fear human 
presence – except the one of their herders coming once a week - they stay away from potential 
thieves and villages. Hence, the dozen of villages form a sort of fencing.  
Schematically, 4 types of farming systems co-exist in Mivili (see table 1): (i) Betsileo smallholders (ii) 
Betsileo large farmers (iii) Betsileo large farmers and herders (iv) Sakalava large cattle farmers. The 
different farming systems cohabit but also experience tensions and competition over land use. 
Schematically, tensions occur between farmers and herders but are generally presented in a way 
stigmatizing the identity of the social groups: “the Sakalava cattle frequently devastate at night the 
farmers’ rice fields”, while “the Betsileo rice producers progressively develop new lowlands in the 
(Sakalava) grazing areas”.   
  
                                                     
6 Kijana is a malagasy word referring to cattle pasture and rest area.   
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  Betsileo Sakalava 
  1. Small farmers  2. Large farmers 
3. Large farmers and 
herders 
4. Large cattle 
keepers 
Cultivated land 
0,5 to 1,5 ha, share‐
cropping with relatives >1,5 ha >2 ha 
Sometimes rice plots 
>2ha 
Land given in share 
cropping 
/ sometimes > 2 ha > 20 ha 
Appropriated non 
cultivated land 
Sometimes small land 
for rice production from 
parents 
Parts of close pasture and land for rice 
production 
Communal pasture 
land  
(> 5000 ha)   Small kijana 
Main crops Rice, Manioc, Vegetables Rice, Manioc, Lemon, Vegetables Rice 
Material 
Few, often access trough 
other farmers 
Complete material 
Cattle 0 to 2 2 to 4 
5 to 15                              
Close pasture grazing 
50 to 300                           
Extensive cattle 
keeping 
Off farm jobs Basket making, sale of palm leaves ? 
Sale of labor 
4 months during the dry season 
No 
Collective work during 
rainy season (often) 
Collective work during rainy season 
(rarely) 
 Income/person 
(MGA) 
 (prior to the company 
arrival on the basis of 
a significant 
example) 
675 000 2 200 000 4 000 000 12 000 000 
 
Table 1: Simplified typology of farming systems. Source: Authors 
 
The agribusiness farm 
In 2009, a European company established in the zone, aiming to cultivate 5000 hectares (ha) of 
jatropha to produce biofuel. The investor used to work in the European finance sector and hence have 
no experience in agriculture. He self-financed the first buildings and show-case plantations, but he is 
now actively seeking external funding from banks or investment funds to finance the whole project. 
The company has simultaneously engaged in two parallel routes to negotiate land access: the informal 
one through negotiation with the mayor, head of the concerned villages and some inhabitants; and the 
formal one through the legal procedure required by the state land services (the red line in figure 1 and 
3 showing the delimitation of the area about to be registered as a 30 years land lease). With the local 
permission and without any finalized legal authorization (cf. infra), the company developed the first 
plots. As numerous investments started recently in southern countries (Papazian, 2010; Nhamtubo 
and Salomão, 2010; Deininger et al., 2011), progress with implementation is limited and area in 
operation much smaller than the one targeted, due to unanticipated technical difficulties, lack of 
agronomical expertise, financial problem and negotiations or, even, tensions with local communities. 
By early 2011, 230 ha of Jatropha and 6 ha of Pepper have been cultivated. The company promised 
jobs (with priority access for villagers), services and infrastructure, like roads, schools or churches. In 
2011, a small health post has been built, and a doctor and two school teachers were monthly paid. 
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I. Job opportunities and economic interactions  
Labor exchange and mutual aid 
At the national level, mutual aid system is still largely practiced. According to EPM (2006), farmers 
resort to labor exchange on 36% of the plots and to daily paid workers on 27% of the plots. In the area 
under concern, most Betsileo farmers also engage in two types of labor investment.  
First, in a local mutual aid system (“valintanana”), groups of farmers (relatives and neighbors) help 
each other on the rice plots during the work peaks (transplanting and harvest)7. Valintanana literally 
means “giving a hand” and is based upon reciprocity relations. The owners provide meals and, in 
many cases, give a monetary compensation (2000 to 2500 MGA8 per worker a day – the interviewees 
explained that “it is a way to thank the workers, it is not really a wage – nobody would work for a wage 
of 2 000 MGA a day” – “it is a way to keep money inside the family network”). Smaller farmers 
regularly invest more labor force than they get in return but enjoy latter on other supports in return 
(rice, material for plowing etc…). Especially for the smallholders, this mutual aid system can act as an 
insurance system (Gannon and Sandron, 2006), as they “may eat next year the rice they are planting 
today on their neighbor’s plot”9. 
Secondly, most of the Betsileo farmers, having few on-farm activities during the dry season, leave 
Mivili during 4 months to look for jobs in Miassa (about 30 km far); the rice plain being irrigated and 
then cultivated all the year round. The daily wage is about 3 000 MGA.  
Creation of new jobs for local farmers and immigrants  
For the 230 ha of jatropha, the company employed the first year 160 seasonal jobs (3 months in 
average for nursery and transplantation works), and plan to hire about 20 full-time workers in the 
future. On the 6 ha pepper plantation, it employed 60 full-time workers. On the long run, the company 
will probably stop pepper production (developed to compensate the absence of jatropha production 
during the 3 first years). It will employ for the jatropha plantation 1 seasonal worker (6 months job) for 
every 1 or 2 ha10  and 1 full-time job per 10 ha - i.e. on the basis on the maximum hypothesis, an 
equivalent to 6 full time jobs per 10 ha. As harvesting is not mechanized, large jatropha plantation 
appears to be a labor intensive crop compare to other large scale plantations11 (Deininger and Norton, 
2009). In an effective 5000 ha plantation scenario, the company will employ 2500 to 5000 seasonal 
workers, and 500 permanent workers. As job opportunities near the villages are scarce especially 
during the dry season (no work on rice plots), those jobs are locally attractive even if the tasks are 
considered as difficult12. The workers are successively hired for 15 days periods, (even full-time 
workers employed since 1 or 2 years) paid 3500 MGA a day (about 1,23 €)13, and most of them did 
not got any legal contract.  The estimated number of jobs created is significant compared to the local 
population, estimated at about 300 to 400 persons per village (1500 to 2000 persons in the 5 nearby 
villages). 
Who are the workers? Within the local population, interests to get jobs vary. During the dry season, 
most of the Betsileo farmers (small and large) are interested in working on the agribusiness 
plantations instead of emigrating to Miassa. During the rainy season, only small farmers sell their labor 
to the company and they do it when they have no more work on their farm. By contrast, Sakalava 
cattle herders do not look for the jobs as they are neither geographically accessible nor financially 
                                                     
7 As the water level of each plot determines the period of rice cultivation, work peaks differ from one plot to the 
other and range from November until June. 
8  Ariary (MGA) is the currency of Madagascar. In early 2011 the change was 1 euro= 2850 MGA 
9  A farmer of Mivili area – june 2011.  
10 The future demand for labor force will depend on the future jatropha yields. 
11 Roughly, for 1 000 ha, oil palm in Indonesia requires 350 equivalent annual jobs, sugar ethanol manual, 700 jobs, 
sugar ethanol mechanized, 350 jobs, maize fully mechanized, 4 jobs. 
12 On the plantations laborers start early in the morning and work 8 hours without a break for food, which is 
considered as difficult compared to working hours on the local farmers’ rice plots (6 hours, with a break for food) 
13 For 6 days work a week, they are paid in 91 000 MGA a month (about 32€), similarly to the minimum wage of 
91 520 MGA per month (April 2011). 
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interesting compared to cattle breeding (as they declared during interviews)14. As observed in the past 
and still nowadays (eg. Li, 2011 ; Deininger et al., 2011), the jobs created by the development of the 
large farm are partly filled by migrants. In Mivili, migrants are generally landless farmers who used to 
work as day laborer in the Miassa rice plain and came to work on the agribusiness plantations. In 
2011, 40 men and women settled in the villages next to the plantations. Landless immigrants work on 
the plantations all year long, while the local farmers, even the smallholders, sell their labor force only 
when they have no work on their own plots. Encountering no local demand for permanent jobs and 
trying to reduce transaction costs (recruitment, selection, learning costs, ect.), the company starts then 
to give priority access to migrants. This prioritization might create social tensions on a long run.  
Changes in work force allocation for Betsileo farmers 
What changes do occur in work force allocation for local farmers?  
During the dry season, the jobs offered the first year by the company replaced the ones occupied in 
the Miassa rice plain (both offer a similar daily wage15, but the former, despite their harder working  
conditions, are local and do not impose seasonal migration).  
During the rainy season, almost all Betsileo farmers give priority to growing rice. They consider, as 
stated during interviews, that working on their own farm is economically more profitable then getting 
employed by the company (verified in our calculations16). In addition, in line with a “food first” strategy, 
local farmers prefer above all ensuring their self consumption of rice and diverse reciprocity transfers 
(young farmers who farm their parents’ plots provide them rice in exchange for land access).  
When they have no work on their own rice plots, farmers are either carrying out other farming or non 
farming activities (leafy vegetable growing, basket making) or working on neighboring farms (mutual 
aid).  
Since the company development, some are interested in selling labor to the plantations. Competition 
in work force allocation appears then between companies paid jobs and other prior activities. Some 
female farmers now prefer working for the company than making baskets or producing leafy 
vegetables. Their main arguments were that the jobs were more profitable – which was confirmed by 
our own calculations17 - and offered regular payments in cash. The leafy vegetable production 
profitability was moreover jeopardized by the commoditization of the manure market18. Indeed, 
before the arrival of the company, cattle owners gave manure for free to the women, as manure was 
available in large quantities in the cattle pens. With the company’s large demand for manure for 
jatropha fertilization, cattle owners start selling manure (they got then a new income source, but these 
latter was insignificant compared to their total income19).   
Changes in mutual aid system on rice fields 
Many smaller farmers took on jobs on the plantations and then invested less time on their 
relatives/neighbors’ plots. They opted for these jobs to have a 15 days cash wages even if they 
complain about the working conditions. Compared to the one on rice fields, they consider the 
company’s working conditions as harder, socially less valuable (based on hierarchical and not on 
reciprocity relations) and less paid (the company salary is higher per day but lower per hour). All the 
                                                     
14 As verified by our calculations, Sakalava cattle breeders have in general high revenues compared to the other 
farming systems (see table 1). 
15 The daily wage in Miassa was 3000 MGA in 2010 and raised to 4000 MGA in 2011. 
16 Revenues going from 6 471 to 12 689 MGA per working day.  
17 Both activities do generate less than the daily wage of the company jobs (3500 MGA per day): 2308 MGA for 
basked making and 1100 MGA for vegetable production.  
18 Value-added fell down to 523 MGA per hour. 1 are of vegetables production needs 20 bags of 50 kilo manure 
(30 000 MGA (10,5€) additional costs, while the value-added per are is only about 60 000 MGA (21€)). 
19 The yearly value-added by a cattle herding system of 10 zebus (kept in pens) is about 2.8 millions MGA (about 
980€). The manure sale adds about 90 000 MGA (32€) (60 bags sold for 1500 each) (+3% of the value-added, which 
increases the total revenue of the farming system by little less than 1%). 
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workers claim wage increase, better working conditions and labor contracts but until now without 
success. 
The company has induced changes not only on the local labor market but also in the mutual aid 
system. In reciprocal and collective labor exchange, the farmers who invited their relatives/neighbors 
working on their plots start giving monetary compensation equal to the company’s daily wage (ie an 
increase from zero or maximum 2500 MGA per day to 3500 MGA per day). Two major reasons, given 
by interviewees and reformulated here, can explain this evolution. First, local farmers have to be as 
attractive as the company to get workers during labor peaks (the company’s implementation has 
increased the farmers’ opportunity costs). Second, as many farmers have worked on the company 
plantations during the first labor peak (160 jobs), more cash was available to cover this higher 
compensation for relatives helping out on the rice plots. The implementation of the company will then 
possibly foster the transition, already ongoing, from reciprocity to commoditized labor relation (e.g. 
Gannon and Sandron, 2005; Sandron, 2008). 
Income evolution   
Based on the typology of farming system, the smaller farmers and the new migrants enjoyed an 
income increase thanks to new jobs opportunities (+24% for local seasonal workers and better access 
to cash in the most representative scenario20, +50% for the migrants). Even if their income is still 
limited compared to others farmers/herders of the Mivili area, they are the one who have benefited in 
the first place from the company implementation and its indirect effects (wage increase and paid labor 
relations), all the more that they did not lose land access (cf infra). Hence, as observed in a case study 
in Senegal (Maertens and Swinnen, 2009), the more vulnerable households are net beneficiary of the 
large farm development. But these advantages can be counterbalanced in the midterm, if the fewer 
labor investment in mutual aid system induce less support from their social networks and then the 
deprivation of an important safety net; and in the long term, when company jobs are mainly proposed 
during the rainy season (jatropha harvesting tasks overlapping then on rice production tasks) and 
priority is given to seasonal/migrant labor.   
Based on the typology of farming system, the bigger farmers are constrained to pay higher 
wages/monetary compensation and then face additional costs for the rice production (+ 50 000 to 
100 000 MGA per ha, profit decrease from 5 to 15 % per ha). Only some of them manage to cover 
those extra-costs by taking on company daily jobs. In addition, they are the one who lose land access.   
New practices – new shops 
Until now, no technology transfers – yet regularly underlined as a major input of large farms 
development (Deininger and al., 2011) - has occurred from the company to the local population. Local 
population does innovate but they adopted new practices from the migrants – who rent land21 and 
cultivate onions – by developing onion crops. Thanks to higher or more regular cash income, some 
immigrants have developed small shops and other businesses (selling food, coffee or alcohol).  
II. Access to land and control over this access 
First negotiation  
The investor has simultaneously engaged in two parallel routes to negotiate land access: the informal 
one and the formal one. Regarding this latter, state land services require that claimants obtain various 
authorisations in order to verify that the targeted land is neither titled (whether in the name of private 
landowners or of the state) nor occupied/certified. Indeed, according to the 2005 land laws, local rights 
are legally recognized and local governments, through the establishment of a local land registry office 
                                                     
20 This is the case for farmers who worked during 4 months in the dry season on the plantations, and during 1 
month in the rainy season. Farmers who worked only during the dry season increased their income by 13%, while 
full time workers enjoyed an increase of +44%. But working full time for the company implicates that the farmer has 
less time for rice production, what only very few farmers are willing to do. 
21 No changes in the rental market have occurred yet. 
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(guichet foncier), can formalize private property rights and issue land certificates (certificat foncier)22. 
But in the case under concern, the local government has not yet such a local land office and no plots 
have been legally registered / certified. In addition, the investor delayed the full realization of the legal 
procedure, waiting for a more conducive political context23. Hence, the state land service has not yet 
carried out the field visits to verify that the land about to be leased to the company was not 
encroaching on occupied land (enjoying a first legal protection) or certified land (enjoying a full legal 
protection)24.  
The investor has also conducted local negotiations to implement a bottom-up approach but, above all, 
to carry out, without delay, trial and show-case plantations in order to attract new funding to engage 
large-scale projects. He got informal agreement from the local mayors, the leaders of three Betsileo 
villages and some inhabitants. These latter welcomed the agribusiness farm in exchange of the 
promises of jobs and infrastructures, like roads, schools or churches. In addition - and it was most 
probably the main motive - they hoped that the jatropha plantations make a natural fence protecting 
their rice fields from the Sakalava cattle. They then agreed to temporarily give to the company a 50 ha 
plot located close to their villages (on the “small kijana” – the closest pasture areas). Some farmers 
also hoped that the Sakalava will displace their cattle, which could give them access to lowland 
suitable for rice production.  They did not really know or understand that the company was looking for 
5000 ha (most farmers stated during interviews that they think that the company will not extend the 
plantations and will cultivate only for a 5 years period) and has already initiated a formal procedure to 
get a legal land lease. In addition, if the company do negotiate with (most of) the Betsileo farmers, it 
unintentionally excluded the Sakalava cattle keepers. The company sealed the informal agreement by 
sacrificing cows as offerings for the ancestors and, above all, paid land taxes on the 5000 ha area to 
the mayor - 3000 ariary/ha (1 €) a total 15 million Ar per year (5200€) which is about a 50% increase 
of local government budget.  
First claims from Betsileo landowners  
Thanks to a local agreement and without any legal authorization, the company developed the first 
plots. As the project began developing, the investors came to face different Betsileo land ownership 
claims. Dealing only with the mayor, the company did not negotiate systematically access to all plots 
and farmed some non cultivated but already appropriated plots. The concerned landowners claimed 
then a land rent. Acting as brokers, the mayor tries to find trade-offs (see Burnod et al., 2012). As the 
local landowners do not pay their land fees on uncultivated land, the mayor suggested that, in 
exchange for the land use, the investor would pay the land fees in their place and in their name. The 
mayor argued that the landowner will get back his land after the company’s departure. This induced no 
extra cost for the firm manager since he had already accepted to pay land fees on the whole targeted 
area. But these trade-offs are unfair for the local landowners. The latter do not perceive any rent (and 
they complain on that point) and they are not aware of the ongoing investor’s legal procedure. 
Moreover, they may miss the opportunity to legally claim their rights. The land could be registered on 
the name of the state25 and allocated to the investor while the local landowners could lose their legal 
status of landowner and become squatters.   
 
 
                                                     
22 In October 2011, 400 Malagasy municipalities, or one-fourth of the total number of municipalities at the country 
level, had set up land registry offices. The latter have received 120 000 applications and delivered approximately 
60,000 certificates in about four years. Over the same period, the State land services have delivered by the means of 
registration an average of 1,500 land titles per year. 
23 After the 2009 coup, lots of investors have suspended the legal procedure fearing that the new regime refuses 
leasing land to foreign investors or signs contestable contracts.  
24 Nevertheless, analysis of other cases has revealed that field visits and procedure led by the state land service do not 
allow nor the identification neither the respect of existing local rights (Burnod et al., 2012). One main reason is that 
land services staff, decision makers or elected representatives (willfully) ignore the fact that the land is no more state 
land.  
25 To deliver a land lease to a foreign company, the state has first to register the plot on its own name. 
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Overlapping of jatropha plantations on Sakalava pastures 
But above all, the established jatropha plantations are overlapping on the communal pasture land -the 
big kijana (see figure 1). The Sakalava herders, not included to the negotiating process, noticed that 
the first jatropha plantations encroached on their land. Sakalava cattle owners are then opposed to the 
jatropha plantation and its expansion, these latter jeopardizing their cattle farming system including 
5000 heads, and hence, their income, and their socio-political power and identity. As first occupants of 
the zone, they claim to be the traditional landowners of the pasture, defined as « their ancestors’ 
land».  
III. Rising social tensions  
Due to differential gains induced by job opportunities and new infrastructures as well as differential 
loses relative to access to land and other natural resources, tensions arise between different groups, 
experiencing (or expecting) different interactions with the company (see table 2).  
 
Table 2 : Global Interactions between the company and the main interest groups. Source: Authors 
 
Increasing discontent from Betsileo  
The Betsileo villagers, especially the larger farmer and cattle herder in the western area encounter first 
transformations of their farming system and natural resources use. The location of the jatropha 
plantations on the small kijana force them to make their cattle graze closer to their cultivated plots, 
 
Betsileo farmers Sakalava cattle farmers (4) 
Immigrants 
 
Small farmers (1) 
Large farmers and 
herders (2+3)   
Benefit from 
infrastructures 
+/- 
1 village only No 
No 
Jobs – labor local 
market  
+/- 
New job opportunities (but not 
guaranteed on the long run) 
Might change the mutual aid 
system 
+/‐ 
Some jobs 
Higher expenses No + 
Income 
+ 
increase 
- 
Decrease  
- 
 
+ 
Land use and 
access 
 
- 
Lose access to land (small 
pastures) 
- 
Lose access to large 
pasture 
No 
+/- 
Lose access to small non cultivated plots 
But hope to gain access to new land   
Natural 
resources  
 
- 
On the long run, competition for water use and palm trees exploitation 
 
No 
Changes of 
farming  
practices 
 
- 
Changes in the herding 
system (small kijana) 
- 
Jeopardizing of 
extensive cattle 
keeping 
No 
+ 
Vegetable production and basket making stops due to 
better opportunities 
Onions production starts 
Hope for protection of their rice fields 
 
Globally and 
schematically 
+ 
 
+/- - + 
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increasing the risks of crops damage. Also cattle must be kept at night in pens during the rainy 
season, increasing infection risks. Moreover, most of the Betsileo don’t experience the expected 
protection of their rice fields, as the Sakalava’s cattle still cross the Jatropha plantations at night. Their 
discontent increases because the company went back on some promises (such as priority access to 
jobs for local or wage increase), farmed plots without prior consent, did develop infrastructures but 
only in one village, started pumping water26 and uprooted palm trees (exploited for wood and leaves). 
Then, they start worrying about and claiming the cessation of plantation expansion. 
Violent opposition from the Sakalava  
Since long, sleeping tensions and struggle for power have shaped the social system of Mivili but the 
company development has awaken these tensions. The Sakalava enjoy more economic power, 
historical legitimacy and political influence in the area than the Betsileo, which allow them maintaining 
and protecting their grazing system from the onward movement of agriculture. When the company 
came, some of the Betsileo seized the opportunity to ally themselves with this foreign actor, regarded 
as more powerful than the Sakalava herders, in order to protect their fields from cattle and to bring 
forward their claims over land. In June 2011, the Sakalava cattle herders violently attacked one of the 
Betsileo villages that agreed to the company implementation, burned 16 houses – including the one of 
the village chief - and stole dozens of cows. Through a resort to violence, the Sakalava wanted to 
defend their customary ownership and reasserted their control over land access. Illicit mechanisms, 
such as violence and threat, can indeed represent alternative and effective ways of controlling or 
maintaining land access (Ribot and Peluso, 2003). This violent attack, not directly addressed to the 
investor considered as able to resort to the police/courts, sought to remind the Betsileo that they have 
no property rights on the communal pasture land. 
Land Tenure insecurity and risk for all farming systems 
All these tensions can potentially create (more) conflicts on a long-run and endanger the land rights 
and activities of all stakeholders.  
They foreshadow that the investor may encounter difficulties maintaining their land access in the future 
even if they do obtain formal land lease. Property is only property if socially legitimate institutions 
sanction it (Lund, 2002). Hence, in a context of institutional and normative pluralism, investors' use 
rights sanctioned by law and state institutions are insufficient to stabilize property relations and confer 
secure land rights for investors. As stated by a herder “official document do not protect neither against 
crop destruction by cattle nor against fire” (Medernach, 2011). Physical fencing being costly and 
inefficient on such large tracks of land, the risk is that investor will have to resort to force (armed 
security staff27) to maintain their rights. 
The Betsileo crops are not yet locally protected (from cattle) and are exposed to an additional risk of 
future conflicts with herders (burn crops). Both Betsileo and Sakalava accuse the mayor of handing 
over their land on his own to collect the land taxes and claim a stronger land management at village 
level.  In addition, some large Sakalava herders and Betsileo farmers start looking for legal protection 
of their land rights (on land located within the targeted 5000 ha) through legal land titling at the land 
state services. The absence of information on the new land laws and the absence of a local land office 
deprive the majority of local landowner to secure their land rights. Unawareness of law by local or 
willful ignorance of law by state representatives to keep legal control over land access (cf Burnod et 
al., 2012), prevent local people to seize the laws and to protect in the legal arena their rights. They 
even risk losing the possibility to resort to any legal registration if the land is finally registered in the 
name of the state.  
 
 
                                                     
26 Intense irrigation of the pepper plantations has induced first signs of scarcity in some rice fields and on 
downstream waters. 
27 After the conflict between the Sakalava and the Betsileo, the company manager and the mayor have hired armed 
police officers to regularly supervise the buildings, villages and plantations 
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Discussion  
Business farm development can indeed directly or indirectly create, inverse or strengthen some 
inequalities and awaken social tensions. Some groups (including state officials) benefit from jobs 
opportunities, infrastructure access or rents while others – and not systematically the more vulnerable 
- do not enjoy these advantages and lose land access. As observed in other countries (Fernandes et 
al. (2010), McCarthy (2010), Ariza et al., 2010), the Mivili case illustrates that any external actor is 
likely to create differential impacts and reactions and often also to disrupt or exacerbate power 
relations. As it clearly apparent on land issue, in order to analyze large-scale acquisition and farm 
development effects, one cannot just analyze the ‘bundle of rights’ on resource but must also take into 
account 'the bundle of powers' relative to control over these resources (Ribot and Peluso, 2003; 
Borras and Franco, 2010). Changes will inevitably occur in these “bundles of power”, when 
transferring land to more powerful external actors, leading to social tensions and conflicts.  
Hence what are the lessons? The study highlights that it is important to overcome the vision of a 
homogenous community to analyze the impact of the agribusiness farm implementation and to identify 
the different groups of interests. Therefore, before all eventual large-scale land transfer to an outsider 
(here a agribusness company, but elsewhere a mining company or an NGO’s promoting a biodiversity 
reserve), a better understanding of the farming system, the diversity of interests and the local land 
tenure is necessary. 
But then, how to ensure better negotiation process, to secure local rights and to take in account the 
diversity of groups/authorities claiming control over land access? Most policy recommendations focus 
on the regulation of large scale land acquisitions and the legal recognition of land rights to secure 
customary rights. Yet, the Mivili case showed that despite the existence of a legal framework for large-
scale land transfers in Madagascar (recognizing local’s land rights), a gap with its effective application 
existed, and on the ground the customary rights were not protected. It is essential to make existing 
laws effective to enhance local community’s real power over land control and management and their 
implication in policy dialogue.   
Locating the negotiation process at the sole local level doesn’t ensure the protection of (and even 
endanger) the rights of all stakeholders (Colin et al., 2009, Borras and Franco, 2010). Often, the 
investor negotiate only with what, for them, are the “most visible” institutions, i.e. positive law 
institutions (Burnod et al., 2012) and local authorities or government cannot be considered 
automatically as representative of all local land users (German et al. 2011). Better legal empowerment 
(through information and certification), mediation by external actors and, above all time, might be 
necessary to smooth exchanges among various groups in terms of interests, resources and power – 
and inside and outside structured arena.   
The question remains how  large scale land investments can contribute to rural development without 
generating large land use competition? The Mivili case shows that a business farm does create job 
opportunities but induces exclusion and conflicts by recquiring large tracks of land.  The concept of 
“idle” or “available” land that need to be invested into, justifying large scale land transfers, need to be 
rethought in a context like in Mivili, where all land is already occupied, used, and even locally disputed. 
It is then questionnable how these large scale land acquisitions could possibly lead to a win-win 
arrangement, without leaving any other groups behind as looser. Investment into agriculture is 
necessary - but to ensure it will be gainfull in terms of rural development, interests of the rural society 
as a whole, including future generations, need to be taken into account and protected (Merlet, 2012). 
Agribusiness company implementations might get accepted easily for short term benefits by a part of 
the population or state authorities, all the more when information about the extent of the project are 
lacking. One year after welcoming the company, farmers in Mivili regret to have “given away the land 
of their children for their own short-term benefits”. The results of this study let conclude that the 
transfers of large tracks of land to external investors don’t seem to be an adapted and inclusive 
approach for rural development. 
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